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The extent to which removing user fees for health care in developing countries 
improves population health rests, in part, on how behavioural responses vary 
across individuals with different health needs. Using data from a randomised 
experiment of free care in Ghana and a measure of baseline health that is both 
objective and broad-based, we examined differential effects for initially ill and 
healthy children. We find that free care improved health seeking behaviour, 
lowered out-of-pocket spending and reduced anaemia amongst children who were 
ill at baseline but had no effect on initially healthy children. Whilst there was no 
health effect on the intervention population taken overall, the evidence suggests 
that removing user fees may have enabled individuals with the greatest health 
need to take up primary health care, thereby improving their health. There was no 
indication that free care encouraged frivolous use of services.  
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I. Introduction 
The debate over whether governments in the developing world should charge user 
fees for health care has received considerable attention for several decades. In 
policy circles and in the academic literature the issue has ignited passions on both 
sides of the argument. When government health budgets were shrinking in the late 
1980s, user fees were proposed as a means to raise much needed revenue and to 
discourage unnecessary use of health services. Recent years have witnessed a 
hardening against this position and a reversal of policy in a growing number of 
countries in Africa (Commission for Africa, 2005; Gilson and McIntyre, 2005).
2
 
The emerging consensus is that “not only do [user fees] deter people from using 
health services and cause financial stress, they also cause inefficiency and 
inequity in the way resources are used” (World Health Organization, 2010). 
Alternatives to user fees – that provide financial protection through tax financing 
or subsidised health insurance – are regarded as a central pillar in the strategy to 
improve access to health services.  
 
Despite the contentious nature of the debate and the extent of the literature, it is 
striking how little rigorous evidence there is on the impact of removing direct 
payments for health care or introducing health insurance. A recent systematic 
literature review on user fees, for example, identified over two hundred papers of 
potential relevance, reduced to just 16 when standard inclusion criteria were 
applied (Lagarde and Palmer, 2008). The authors noted that “only one study was 
found to be of good quality [and] even studies that have been highly influential 
and often quoted failed the quality appraisal.” Another notable gap is evidence of 
the impact of fee removal on health outcomes, as compared to health seeking 
behaviour.  
 
This paper examines the effect of removing user fees for health care on children 
using data from a study in southern Ghana. Our empirical investigation 
complements an earlier paper that presented the initial results of the study. It 
found free care increased utilisation of formal primary care but did not lead to 
health improvements in the population under study as a whole (Ansah et al., 
2009). By exploring heterogeneity in the effect of free health care, this paper 
provides a more nuanced understanding of who benefits and why from the 
removal of user fees, concentrating on the effects on health. On the basis that the 
impact of free care on health status in the general population is likely to be small 
and thus difficult to detect (e.g. Newhouse and and the Insurance Experiment 
Group, 1993), we give particular attention to a subgroup of the population who 
                                                 
2
 Yates (2009) identifies 13 African countries that have removed user fees in the past few decades. 
We know of several countries that were not on this list or have since introduced free health care.  
3 
 
were ill at baseline. We estimate differential effects of free care for children who 
were initially ill and healthy on a comprehensive set of outcomes that include 
health care utilisation, out-of-pocket health care spending, and anaemia status.  
 
The removal of user fees can be characterised as a form of health insurance that is 
anticipated to improve health status through increases in the quantity and quality 
of health care. The extent to which free health care improves population health 
rests, in part, on how behavioural responses vary across individuals with different 
health needs. To illustrate, suppose free care increases health care use of 
individuals who are healthy. Since the marginal benefit of health care for these 
individuals is small, free care will have little or no health impact. Indeed, the 
prospect that removing user fees stimulates only frivolous use has been one of the 
central arguments voiced against the policy because it suggests a channel through 
which free care will fail to improve health (Akin et al., 1987).
3
    
 
It is not obvious, a priori, that heterogeneity in the behavioural response to free 
care will reflect need. The price and income effects of subsidised health care 
should increase utilisation but theory provides little guidance on variation in the 
responsiveness of different population groups. Some have argued that the sick will 
be less responsive to insurance coverage than the healthy because their use of 
services is less discretionary (Manning et al., 1987), but in a developing country 
context there is little evidence in support of this view. A substantial proportion of 
children, in particular the poorest, fail to have access to life-saving health 
interventions (Jones et al., 2003). Moreover, financial barriers in developing 
countries are considerable: out-of-pocket spending on health care represents a 
considerable share of household income (van Doorslaer et al., 2007) and formal 
credit markets function poorly (Morduch, 1995; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
Predictions as to the effect of free care are further obscured by the possibility that 
lower prices for curative care discourage investment in preventive and healthy 
lifestyle behaviours, leading to worse health outcomes (Phelps, 1978). 
 
We shed light on these issues using experimental data from Ghana. In 2005, when 
user fees were the default policy in the public sector, households in one  district 
                                                 
3
 Economists have long emphasised the problem of ex post moral hazard in the standard model of 
health insurance, regarding any increase in demand for health care under insurance as a source of 
inefficiency (Pauly, 1968). Because insured individuals face only a fraction of the full cost of 
medical care, they have inefficient incentives to consume a larger than optimal quantity of services 
(Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968). The welfare loss due to moral hazard, however, is likely to be 
overstated for at least three reasons (Newhouse, 2002). First, there are gains from avoiding the risk 
of financial loss (Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Zeckhauser, 1970). Second, there may be positive 
externalities associated with health care, particularly in the case of preventive services, such that 
health care use absent health insurance is inefficiently low (Culyer and Simpson, 1980). Third, 
health insurance allows individuals to access care that they would otherwise not have been able to 
afford (Nyman, 1999). This is particularly true when health care spending is large relative to 
income (Pauly, 1983). 
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were randomly assigned either to an existing prepayment health insurance scheme 
for which the study paid for enrolment, or a control group. Our analysis exploits 
several unusual features of the data and the study setting. First, we have baseline 
data on health status that provides an objective basis with which to determine 
need. Anaemia is a multi-factorial, broad-based measure of child health status, 
particularly appropriate in a country where malaria is the leading cause of 
morbidity and mortality amongst children under five years of age. It provides a 
suitable candidate to distinguish between children who were ill and those who 
were healthy prior to the removal of user fees. Second, the study collected 
extensive data on malaria-related preventive behaviours, providing the 
opportunity to test for ex-ante moral hazard. A third advantage is the prior 
introduction in the study site of an artemisinin-combination therapy (ACT), an 
antimalarial drug that was shown in the course of the study to be effective and 
widely used by providers. This means that we can be confident that drug quality 
was adequate to generate malaria-related health benefits. 
 
We find that removing direct payments for health care in the public sector 
increased the use of primary care clinics by 20 percent and lowered out-of-pocket 
spending on health care by 37 percent for families of children with anaemia at 
baseline. The increase in utilisation was the result of a shift from informal 
providers to formal providers rather than an increase in the total quantity of 
services. By contrast, free care had no effect on the care seeking behaviour or 
health spending of children with no anaemia at baseline. Consistent with this 
pattern of results, free care reduced anaemia by 14 percent among the group of 
children who were ill at baseline, producing health benefits at all quantiles of the 
initial haemoglobin concentration in this group. We find no health gains for 
initially healthy children or for the population under study overall.  
 
It is impossible to be certain whether these results will generalise to other 
contexts, particularly given the lack of comparable studies exploring the role of 
health need in influencing the impact of health financing schemes. However, in 
this specific setting, the pattern of gains across groups provide encouraging signs 
that the removal of user fees enabled individuals with the greatest health need to 
take up services without promoting frivolous use of services amongst those with 
no capacity to benefit. Though we find benefits of removing user fees, an 
important caveat is that its cost-effectiveness as a policy remains unclear. 
 
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, health economists 
have long been interested in the impact of health insurance and other forms of 
financial protection on health-related outcomes. Despite the extensive literature, 
credible evidence remains limited in developing countries. With the exception of 
two randomised experiments in Mexico (King et al., 2009) and Nicaragua 
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(Thornton et al., 2010), few studies have isolated the causal effect of insurance or 
abolishing user fees from other confounding factors. Second, most evaluations, 
experimental or otherwise, are confined to measuring utilisation and out-of-pocket 
health care spending as an outcome of interest. There is remarkably little 
empirical research in developing countries on the health benefits of removing 
direct payments for health care or health insurance. A key contribution of this 
paper is to study a range of outcomes, thereby providing a comprehensive 
assessment of the benefits (health and consumption smoothing) and costs 
(increased health care utilisation) of removing user fees. 
 
In one important respect, the closest antecedent to our paper is a study of the 
impact of Medicare on mortality (Card et al., 2009). Recognising that few studies 
of health insurance have been able to show health benefits, they focus on a group 
of severely ill patients and find that the discontinuity in Medicare as the primary 
insurer at age 65 corresponds with a fall in mortality. In a similar vein, we focus 
on children who were ill with anaemia before the removal of user fees and find 
economically significant benefits for this group. We go one step further than Card 
et al (2009) to show that not only were there significant differences in impacts for 
ill and healthy children, there were few, if any, gains for the latter group. 
 
Second, we connect to a closely related but distinct literature on the role of price 
in influencing the uptake of health care. Field experiments – on bednets (Cohen 
and Dupas, 2010), home water purification (Ashraf et al., 2010), deworming 
drugs (Kremer and Miguel, 2007) and HIV testing (Thornton, 2008) – have found 
that price is an important determinant of use in developing countries.
4
 These 
papers focus on health products or diagnostic tests, whereas our study is 
concerned with a system-wide health financing reform. The removal of user fees 
as an intervention introduces additional complexities – such as quality of care, 
supply-side incentives, and the timing of care seeking – that require explicit 
recognition and discussion in our study.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of the free 
care study in southern Ghana, including its experimental design. Section III 
describes the data and section IV the empirical methods. Section V presents the 
main findings of the analysis. Section VI considers the potential channels for the 
effect of free care and discusses the implications of the findings. 
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 More precisely, two of these studies sought to disentangle the effect of price on purchase and use 
of health products using a two-stage pricing strategy (Ashraf et al., 2010; Cohen and Dupas, 
2010).  
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II. Background 
II.A Health Financing Policy in Ghana 
After independence in 1957, the new socialist government in Ghana moved to a 
tax-based financing system, instituting free medical services in public sector 
facilities. In the context of Ghana’s weak economy at the time, this system was 
perceived to lead to gradually worsening quality of care with widespread 
shortages of essential medicines, equipment and supplies. In 1985, the then 
military government re-introduced user fees to recover at least 15 percent of 
recurrent expenditure for quality improvements, as part of an IMF and World 
Bank Recovery Programme (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). Before long, these 
reforms had earned the name “cash and carry.” Studies suggested that there was a 
significant drop in health service utilisation and increased inequality, particularly 
in the rural areas (Asenso-Okyere and Dzator, 1997; Creese, 1991; Waddington 
and Enyimayew, 1989; Waddington and Enyimayew, 1990). 
 
During this time, other strategies for financing health care were pursued. One such 
scheme was the Nkoranza hospital based health insurance scheme, initiated by the 
St. Theresa’s Catholic Mission Hospital in 1992. Several other community health 
insurance schemes were set up including the district-wide scheme on which this 
study is based, incidentally the first in the country. Subsequently, similar schemes 
known then as Mutual Health Organizations (MHOs) began springing up with 
facilitation and support from international donors. During this period, two 
attempts were made by the Government of Ghana to set up a social health 
insurance scheme, both of which failed. By 2003, there were over 250 community 
insurance schemes all over the country (Atim, 2010). 
 
In 2001 the newly elected democratic government re-initiated the process of 
establishing a National Health Insurance Scheme. The bill – the National Health 
Insurance Act 650 – was passed into law in 2003. Financing of the scheme is by 
individual premium payments, a 2.5 percent National Health Insurance levy on 
specified goods and services, and a 2.5 percent formal sector worker contribution 
to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust, automatically transferred to 
the National Health Insurance Fund every month. The scheme comprises district-
wide MHOs in every district, into which both formal and the non formal sector 
workers enrol (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008).      
 
II.B Free Health Care Experiment 
We undertook a randomised trial of removing user fees for health care in Dangme 
West, a poor rural district in Southern Ghana with an estimated population of 
115,000 in 2004, around the time of the study. The district had ten primary health 
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facilities, but with no district hospital, inhabitants had to choose from five 
hospitals in neighbouring districts for referral care. Malaria was the leading cause 
of morbidity and mortality in children under five in the study district.   
 
The study provided free health care to households randomly assigned to the 
intervention group by paying for them to enrol into an existing prepayment health 
insurance scheme in May 2004. Households in the control group continued to pay 
a fee-for-service at public health facilities in accordance with the national policy 
at the time. Households who had enrolled into the prepayment scheme prior to the 
start of the study were enlisted on a voluntary basis as a third observational trial 
arm.  
 
The community prepayment insurance scheme began in 2000, covering the costs 
of primary care, including diagnostics and drugs with no limit, and a limited set of 
services provided at the secondary level referral hospital.
5
 It covered the costs of 
health services in the public sector, allowing members to choose from any of the 
primary health facilities in the district and a collaborating referral hospital of their 
choice when referred. To limit adverse selection enrolment had been carried out 
on a voluntary basis at the household rather than the individual level.  
 
For individuals covered by insurance, health providers were reimbursed by the 
scheme on a fee-for-service basis. It is important to emphasise that the price of 
curative care for those assigned to the free care group was not zero. They still 
continued to face other costs of health seeking, such as transport. Data from the 
study show that such costs are nontrivial, accounting for 22 percent of total out-
of-pocket health spending at baseline. 
 
The prepayment insurance scheme was introduced as a response to the problem of 
high out-of-pocket health care expenditures and the inability of families in the 
district to afford these payments. Data from the study confirm these earlier 
observations. At baseline, 17 percent of families who sought care in the past four 
weeks were not able meet the cost with available savings suggesting potential 
credit constraints.
6
 Of those households that had an ill child but did not go to a 
health facility, 38 percent reported the primary reason as “too expensive or could 
not afford it”.  
 
The study was announced to the public only when the enrolment window for the 
year was closed, such that all households that were going to self-select into 
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 The district-wide prepayment scheme studied in this paper was converted into the district-wide 
MHO for Dangme West District after the study was over in 2006. 
6
 This underestimates the extent of the problem because there are likely to be households which 
did not seek care due to credit constraints and the unaffordability of care. 
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insurance had already done so. Treatment and control thus comprised households 
that chose not to self-enrol into the insurance scheme. No household was able to 
change their allocated group at any point during the one year study period because 
the enrolment process occurred only once a year. The study assisted households 
with the administrative process of enrolment, informing members of their benefits 
and ensuring picture identification cards were issued, resulting in full compliance 
with treatment assignment.  
 
Households with at least one child aged 6 to 59 months and not already enrolled 
in the prepayment health insurance scheme were eligible to participate in the 
study. The sample frame consisted of approximately 8,700 households with 
children under five years of age living in the study area. Households were selected 
at random using a computer random number generator and then visited in person. 
A household was excluded if it had no child under six years of age, did not 
provide parental consent, was due to migrate from the study area in the next two 
years, or had previously enrolled into the prepayment scheme. Previous enrolees 
were invited to participate as an observational third arm. 
 
Households were randomised using a stratified procedure in which they were 
divided into three strata based on distance of residence from the nearest health 
facility: less than 5 km; 5 to 10 km; greater than 10 km. A public lottery that 
involved pulling out “yes” and “no” pieces of paper from a rotating barrel was 
used to assign households. For ethical reasons, the study paid for households 
assigned to the control group and those in the observational arm to be enrolled 
into the prepayment scheme the year following the study.   
 
 
III. Data 
III.A Measurement of Outcomes 
The primary health outcome is anaemia, as measured by the proportion of 
children with haemoglobin concentration less than 10 g/dl. This is based on 
criteria developed by the World Health Organisation (DeMaeyer, 1989) and is the 
same definition used by Ghana’s Demographic and Health Survey (Ghana 
Statistical Service et al., 2009). Anaemia is a good marker of overall health – it is 
a commonly used objective outcome of community interventions on malaria 
morbidity and its causes include malaria, inadequate dietary intake of iron and 
intestinal worm infection, all of which are entirely treatable. We also use the 
absolute level of haemoglobin concentration as an alternative measure of health. 
Haemoglobin concentration was measured just before and one year after the 
introduction of the free care intervention during a household survey that took 
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finger-prick blood samples from children aged between 6 and 59 months. Other 
measures of health status include malaria parasitaemia, and anthropometic 
measurements such as weight and height. Laboratory methods are described in 
more detail elsewhere (Ansah et al., 2009).  
 
Data on health care seeking behaviour was collected using pictorial diaries that 
were supplied to households and collected by trained fieldworkers on a monthly 
basis during a six month follow-up period so as to limit problems of recall. These 
diaries recorded the type of illness the child suffered from during the period as 
well as the type of health provider visited, with the possible options including 
primary health clinic, hospital, private pharmacy, and traditional healer. We refer 
to the first two as formal health care providers and the remaining two choices as 
informal providers. The pictorial diary data are used to calculate utilisation at the 
extensive margin (ie. any visit) and visits per person per year. During the baseline 
and endline household surveys, we also collected data on out-of-pocket spending 
on health care, using a recall period of four weeks. Expenditure data relate to the 
costs of medical care and other costs such as those associated with transport to 
and from the health care provider. Finally, additional data on malaria-related 
preventive behaviours (eg. use of insecticide treated bednets) and family 
characteristics were collected through the household survey, conducted at both 
baseline and endline.  
 
III.B Capacity to Benefit 
The analysis presented in this paper is largely devoted to exploring heterogeneity 
in the effect of providing free health care with respect to need. The concept of 
need is not easy to define. It is value-laden and difficult to operationalise, and 
further complicated when the discussion is framed in terms of resource allocation 
(Culyer, 1995). For the purposes of our study, we simply wish to make the 
conceptual distinction between any need and no need. We therefore frame need in 
terms of capacity to benefit which allows us to ignore ill health that is not 
amenable to medical intervention.  
 
Consistent with the objective of most health care systems, we use the term benefit 
to refer to health gain. To identify potential benefits (health gains), need should be 
measured objectively. Implicitly, this means we are not concerned with the idea of 
felt need, although we fully recognise that an individual’s own perception of ill 
health is likely to be a strong motivating factor to seek health care.  
 
We operationalise this concept of need by using baseline data on children’s 
anaemia status. Specifically, anaemia is used to identify ill and healthy children 
prior to randomisation and the removal of user fees. Of course, no one indicator of 
health status can be considered a perfect measure of capacity to benefit. However, 
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for children in the study who live in an area where malaria is a major contributor 
to morbidity and mortality and entirely curable with locally available technology, 
we believe that anaemia is a salient measure with which to generate a 
dichotomous indicator of capacity to benefit.  
 
III.C Sample Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
Of the 2,332 households (with 2,757 children of eligible age) that were randomly 
selected from the district database to participate in the study, no household 
refused consent.
7
 Within this total, 138 households with 165 children had already 
enrolled voluntarily into the prepayment health insurance scheme by the time the 
registration window had closed. They were excluded from the main study but 
retained as an observational arm. The remaining 2,194 households with 2,592 
children were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups.  
 
At the baseline household survey in May 2004 a total of 2,151 households with 
2,524 children were found and interviewed (1,227 children in the intervention arm 
and 1,297 in the control arm). In the final household survey, carried out at the end 
of the malaria transmission season between December 2004 and February 2005, 
969 households with 1,124 children in the intervention arm (attrition of 8 percent) 
and 1,012 households with 1,197 children in the control arm (attrition of 7 
percent) were successfully follow-up. The characteristics of households lost to 
follow-up do not vary by treatment arm. In total, we have endline haemoglobin 
concentration data for 2,321 children and endline utilisation data for 2,319 
children. 
 
Table A1 in the Appendix compares anaemia outcomes and characteristics of the 
households in our sample at baseline with the observational arm and the rural 
sample of Ghana’s nationally representative Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) 2008. Almost 40 percent of children in the study sample had anaemia at 
baseline. One third of mothers have no education, the majority of households are 
Christian and the predominant ethnicity in this region is Dangme. As expected, 
there are differences between the study sample and the observational arm. 
Specifically, those who self-enrolled into the prepayment insurance scheme are 
healthier and socioeconomically better off. There are also differences between the 
study sample and the national rural sample from the DHS. Anaemia is less 
prevalent in the study sample. There is greater ownership of assets but also a 
greater proportion of un-educated mothers in the study sample. 
 
                                                 
7
 The sample size was calculated to allow detection of an absolute difference of 0.3 g/dl in mean 
haemoglobin concentration between the two treatment arms with a power of 90 percent at a 
significance level of 5 percent, allowing for loss to follow-up and clustering of children within the 
same household (Ansah et al., 2009).  
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IV. Empirical Methods 
IV.A Econometric Models 
To measure the overall effect of removing user fees on outcomes, we run 
regressions of the form:  
 
                     ,   (1) 
 
where     is our outcome, a measure of health care use, health status or health 
care spending, for child   in household  ,    is an indicator equal to one if 
household   was assigned to free care, and     is a set of individual and 
household characteristics measured at baseline. The covariates include age, 
education of mother, number of children in the household, household wealth 
score, and dummies for gender and categories of distance from the nearest health 
facility, religion and ethnicity. Note that inclusion of the covariates should 
improve precision but is not needed for an unbiased estimate of the treatment 
effect due to the randomised design. We show results with and without these 
controls. Since there was full compliance with assignment, we are estimating the 
average treatment effect on the treated. In all specifications, we cluster the 
standard errors at the household level to deal with correlation between children in 
the same household and to account for the fact that treatment assignment was 
done on a household basis.  
 
The main subgroup analysis uses a classification scheme that divides the sample 
into two based on whether the child was anaemic at baseline. We classify children 
as having severe or moderate anaemia if the haemoglobin concentration is less 
than 10 g/dl, and no anaemia if the level is 10 g /dl or above. Anaemia status 
provides an objective measure of capacity to benefit pre-randomisation and 
distinguishes this study from those that use self-reported or subjective measures of 
health.
8
  
 
Formally, we run the following regression to identify the treatment effect within 
each subgroup of ill and healthy children: 
 
                                      , (2) 
 
                                                 
8
 We note that the data show, as expected, a negative correlation between haemoglobin 
concentration and various measures of nutritional status (ie. wasting, stunting and underweight) 
and malaria parasitaemia. 
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where     is a dummy that indicates whether the child was anaemic at baseline 
and is included in the set of covariates,    . The effect of removing user fees in 
each subgroup is given by    and    respectively. To explore flexibly the effect 
of free care on haemoglobin concentration at different levels of the initial 
distribution, we estimate two separate regressions of endline haemoglobin 
concentration on baseline values either side of the anaemia cut-off in both 
treatment and control. We then plot local averages and fitted values from a third-
order polynomial.  
 
To understand how the intervention worked, we estimate the effect of free care on 
different sets of outcomes in an attempt to trace its impact along the causal 
pathway. We also discuss possible channels leading to the reduced form impact of 
free care in Section VI. For now, we note that because the study selected 
participants from households who had not enrolled in the prepayment scheme, we 
identify the effect of moving from no insurance coverage to full coverage.  
 
IV.B Validating the Experimental Design 
We validate the experimental design by investigating treatment-control balance of 
the covariates in the entire sample of children and in each of the two subgroups of 
ill and healthy children. Table 1 tests covariate balance by showing the mean 
value of each variable by intervention group and the p value for treatment and 
control differences.  
 
Panel A in Table 1 confirms that randomisation resulted in balance across the 
covariates in the full sample of children enrolled into the study. With the 
exception of “Dangme” ethnicity, the mean differences are not significant for any 
of the pre-randomisation covariates or baseline haemoglobin concentration. Panel 
B and Panel C of Table 1 provide evidence that treatment and control groups are 
also balanced in each of the two subgroups of children with and without anaemia 
at baseline.  
 
One potential source of concern when it comes to estimation is attrition. We 
further tested the validity of the experimental design by comparing the balance of 
baseline covariates on the subsample of children who were followed-up at the 
study end. We are unable to reject the null of treatment and control balance in the 
two samples of ill and healthy children.
9
 There are no significant differences 
between treatment and control in the means of any of the covariates in the sample 
of children with anaemia at baseline (result not shown). The difference between 
                                                 
9
 When we regress the treatment group dummy on the pre-randomisation covariates, the 
corresponding F statistics and p values are as follows: for children with anaemia at baseline, F stat 
(0.80) and p value (0.6197); and for children with no anaemia at baseline, F stat (1.24) and p value 
(0.2670). 
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intervention groups in initial haemoglobin concentration is borderline significant 
at the 10 percent level in the sample of children without anaemia. For this reason, 
we control for baseline haemoglobin concentration as a further robustness check 
in our health impact equations.  
 
 
V. Results 
In Section V.A we examine the behavioural responses to free care, showing that 
moving from a system of cost-sharing with user fees to one in which care is free at 
the point of use increases utilisation of primary care services, but only amongst 
those who were ill at baseline. We then show in Section V.B that these 
behavioural differences between initially ill and healthy children generate a 
similar pattern in the effect of free care on endline health status, as measured by 
anaemia. In Section V.C we extend the analysis, first by quantifying the effect of 
primary care on anaemia, and then by presenting findings from a set of fully 
interacted models. Section V.D tests for the presence of ex-ante moral hazard. 
Finally, in Section V.E we use expenditure data to show that the higher the out-of-
pocket spending on health care the greater the effect of removing user fees. 
 
V.A Effect on Use of Curative Care 
We estimate the effect of free health care on use of formal health providers. In 
presenting the results, we focus on clinics (primary level care). Results for other 
types of health provider, shown in Table A2 of the Appendix, are discussed 
below. Table 2 presents the overall effect of removing user fees and point 
estimates in the two subgroups of children with and without anaemia at baseline. 
Panel A shows treatment effects at the extensive margin (ie. probability of any 
visit), analysed using probit estimation with marginal coefficient estimates 
reported. Panel B shows the effect on the total number of visits per year, estimated 
by OLS. We report estimates from models with and without demographic 
controls, both of which produce very similar results. 
 
The overall effect of removing user fees was to increase the likelihood of any 
clinic visit by 3.7 percentage points or 5.9 percent (panel A, column 1). Across 
subgroups, however, differential effects emerge. There was a larger, statistically 
significant effect of free care of 8.9 percentage points or 14.5 percent on children 
with anaemia at baseline (panel A, column 2). By contrast, the point estimate for 
children with no anaemia at baseline is both small and statistically insignificant 
(panel A, column 3). The coefficients in the two subgroups are significantly 
different from each other at the 5 percent level in both models. To the extent that 
the absence of anaemia is a good proxy of being healthy, these findings suggest 
14 
 
that free care did not encourage frivolous use of health services amongst those 
with no capacity to benefit.
10
  
 
A similar pattern of results emerges when we examine utilisation in terms of total 
clinic visits per year. Table 2 shows a positive effect of free care on use of 
primary care in the entire sample of children (panel B, column 1). There was a 
large impact amongst children with anaemia at baseline (panel B, column 2) but, 
mirroring the results on the extensive margin, there was no statistically significant 
effect on use of curative care in the group of children with no anaemia at baseline 
(panel B, column 3).
11
  The impact estimate of 0.53 clinic visits per year in the 
group of children with anaemia at baseline is equivalent to a 20 percent increase 
in utilisation. The coefficients in the two subgroups are borderline significantly 
different from each other at the 10 percent level. Owing to the skewed nature of 
the data on total utilisation, we have less statistical precision than on the extensive 
margin, thus making it more difficult to detect a difference between the two 
subgroups.  
 
In Table A2 of the appendix, we present estimates of the effect of removing user 
fees on use of other types of health provider. Free care had no effect on use of 
public hospitals, both overall and in either of the two subgroups, implying that 
improvements in care seeking behaviour were limited to primary care services. 
The findings in panel B of Table A2 suggest that the positive effect of free care on 
utilisation of clinics was the result of a substitution away from informal drug 
sellers (private pharmacies).  
 
V.B Effect on Anaemia 
Next we investigate whether the increase in use of curative care in the group of 
children who were ill at baseline translates into improvements in health status. In 
Table 3 we present results on both anaemia status (Panel A) and haemoglobin 
concentration (Panel B). Although our balancing tests suggest the control and 
treatment groups are similar within the two subgroups, as a robustness check we 
run a third model in which we control for baseline haemoglobin concentration as 
well as the usual set of demographics. 
 
Overall, we find that removing user fees had no effect on the proportion of 
children with anaemia (panel A, column 1) or mean haemoglobin concentration of 
                                                 
10
 One caveat to consider is the fact that children in the third observational arm were both healthier 
and used services more than children in the treatment arm at the endline survey. For obvious 
reasons such a comparison is problematic but it does raise the possibility that those in the 
observational arm were over-using services.  
11
 Because of the skewed nature of the utilisation data (ie. the number of clinic visits contains 
many zeros), we also estimated treatment effects using count models. The results from a poisson 
specification remain qualitatively unchanged (results not shown). 
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children (panel B, column 1). The failure of the intervention to show an impact on 
anaemia was not due to inadequate treatment of malaria at health facilities as ACT 
treatment was introduced prior to the start of the trial and shown during the course 
of the trial to be effective and widely used.
12
  
 
In line with the previous results on utilisation, free care is shown to reduce the 
proportion of children with anaemia by almost 6 percentage points or around 16 
percent in the group of children who were ill at baseline (panel A, column 2). 
Estimates are significant at the 10 percent level when controls are included, but 
not in the baseline model. By contrast, free care had no effect on children with no 
anaemia at baseline (panel A, column 3). The coefficients in the two subgroups 
are significantly different from each other at the 10 percent level. 
 
A similar pattern of results is shown in panel B of Table 3 when we consider 
haemoglobin concentration as the outcome of interest. Free care increased 
haemoglobin concentration in the children who were anaemic at baseline by 0.20 
d/gl or 2 percent (panel B, column 2). The estimated effect is larger and has 
greater precision when controlling for individual-level covariates. There is almost 
no change in the point estimate when we additionally control for baseline 
haemoglobin concentration. The point estimate in the group of children with no 
anaemia at baseline is not significantly different from zero (panel B, column 3). 
Differences in the coefficients between the two subgroups are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
It is interesting to note the difference between the relatively small effect of free 
care on haemoglobin concentration and the larger effect on the proportion of 
children with anaemia. It suggests that the increase in haemoglobin concentration 
was focused on children at the threshold of no longer being anaemic. In Figure 1, 
we plot the distributions of the endline haemoglobin concentration by initial 
anaemia status to show that this is indeed the case for children with no anaemia at 
baseline. By contrast, there is no difference in the treatment and control 
distributions of haemoglobin concentration for children with no anaemia at 
baseline. 
 
Further graphical evidence in Figure 2 shows that all children with anaemia at 
baseline benefited from free health care. Following the nonparametric approach 
taken by Duflo et al (2011), we regress children’s endline haemoglobin 
concentration on their baseline value using a third order polynomial, estimated 
                                                 
12
 At endline a total of 101 children with fever or histories of fever had a positive rapid diagnostic 
test for malaria and were treated with amodiaquine and artesunate. All 86 who were traced 14 days 
later had cleared their parasitaemia. Only 4 out of 924 study participants tested positive using a 
dipstick assay for the chloroquine, the drug previously used to treat malaria. 
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separately either side of the anaemia cut-off value in both treatment and control 
groups. For children who were anaemic at baseline (ie. left of the vertical red 
line), fitted values of endline haemoglobin concentration in the free care treatment 
group are always above those in the control group. However, for children who 
were not anaemic at baseline (ie. right of the vertical red line), there is no 
evidence that free care improved health. 
 
A serious concern for the interpretation of the results thus far is the fact that 
children identified with severe anaemia, fever and parasitaemia in the baseline 
survey were treated in accordance with local guidelines. While it is highly 
unlikely that the biological effect of treatment persisted to the endline survey, it is 
not implausible that parents’ increased awareness of the health of their children 
somehow interacted with the removal of user fees to change health seeking 
behaviour. In a formal test of this possibility, we exclude from the analysis 
children with severe anaemia (haemoglobin concentration less than 8 g/dl) at 
baseline. The results, presented in Appendix A3, indicate that the estimates of 
effect on utilisation for children with moderate anaemia at baseline are of a 
similar magnitude to those found in the main analysis. The effect on anaemia also 
remains positive.
13
 Although by no means definitive given the reduction in sample 
size, these results suggest that the heterogeneity we identify was not simply a 
manifestation of the ethics requirement to treat children identified as ill during the 
baseline survey.   
 
V.C Extensions 
We extend the analysis in several ways. First, we use random assignment of the 
free care intervention to quantify the effect of curative care at primary health 
clinics on haemoglobin concentration in the subgroup of children who had 
anaemia at baseline. We estimate the relationship between haemoglobin 
concentration and use of curative care by two stage least squares (2SLS), using 
free care as an instrument for utilisation. Because free care was randomly 
assigned, it is orthogonal to the error term in the first stage equation. The 
exclusion restriction requires that free care improves health only through its 
influence on primary care seeking, an assumption we discuss in Section VI.  
 
Table 4 shows the first stage and second stage results, measuring utilisation in 
terms of any visit to a clinic. In the first stage we regress use of curative on the 
indicator for whether the family is assigned to receive free care, with the result in 
column 1 suggesting that the relationship is strong. Specifically, the coefficient 
                                                 
13
 The result on utilisation is the key robustness check here. Compared with the main results, we 
anticipate a smaller health impact for children with moderate anaemia at baseline because they 
have a lower capacity to benefit – ie. health care will be more efficacious for those with worse 
initial health. 
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estimate is statistically significant in the first stage equation and the F-statistic on 
the instrument is sufficiently strong to avoid bias due to weak instruments (Stock 
et al., 2002).  
 
Our 2SLS estimate identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE) – that is, 
the effect of curative care on haemoglobin concentration for those children who 
increased utilisation when user fees were removed. The LATE is a parameter of 
policy interest because it applies to the group of individuals who actually changed 
health seeking behaviour in response to a change in health financing policy. The 
point estimate in column 2 is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. It suggests that, for children who had anaemia, making at least one visit to a 
clinic every six months (rather than zero visits) increased a child’s haemoglobin 
concentration by 2.7 d/gl. Note that the equivalent OLS estimate in column 3 
shows little or no relationship between health care use and health status.  
 
In a second extension, we further explore heterogeneity in the impact of free care 
by estimating fully interacted models, whereby every covariate, not simply 
anaemia status at baseline, is interacted with the free care assignment variable. 
These models act as an additional robustness check to test whether it is capacity to 
benefit or in fact socioeconomic factors that drive the results we obtained 
previously in Section V.A and V.B. They are also of interest in their own right, as 
a means to explore heterogeneity across other dimensions.  
 
Table 5 presents the results from two fully interacted models that respectively 
explore the effect of free care on the number of clinic visits per year and 
haemoglobin concentration. These results are striking for several reasons. First, 
observe that differential effects of free care for children who were ill and healthy 
at baseline become stronger when we control for interactions between treatment 
and the full set of covariates. Children with anaemia at baseline benefited 
substantially more than those without anaemia both in terms of improved health 
care seeking (column 1) and haemoglobin concentration (column 2). The 
coefficients on the interaction between free care and initial anaemia status in both 
models are significant with 95 percent confidence.  
 
Next, note that there is little variation across other baseline characteristics. For 
example, we find no evidence of variation in the effect of free care by household 
wealth, mother’s education, or gender of the child, although coefficients in most 
cases are (arguably) in the expected direction. Contrary to expectations, the effect 
of removing user fees was not attenuated by distance. The results suggest that 
there is variation in the health impact of free care across ethnic groups (column 2), 
but we have no theoretical understanding of why this might be the case and 
therefore treat this result with caution. 
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Third, for completeness, we examine the impact of free care for subgroups 
defined according to alternative, albeit less comprehensive and responsive, 
measures of the child’s health status at baseline. These include whether the child 
tested positive for malaria asexual parasitaemia and whether the child was 
underweight at baseline. Table A4 in the Appendix shows impact estimates for 
these two sets of subgroups, with the results indicating that free care did not 
differentially affect health care utilisation or health status. In no instance are the 
coefficients for healthy children and those with poor health significantly different 
from each other at the 10 percent level, as indicated by the p values for the test of 
equality. 
  
V.D Ex-Ante Moral Hazard 
Throughout the paper we have maintained the assumption that the reduction in the 
cost of curative care, brought about by the introduction of free care, does not 
influence behaviour in the prevention of disease. If removing user fees 
encouraged households to be more careless in the (costly) prevention of malaria, 
this could in principle increase use of curative care resulting in no net 
improvement in health. Although it is questionable how plausible the possibility 
of ex-ante moral hazard is in the context of health care, such behaviour may 
explain, for example, why removing user fees had no overall effect on 
haemoglobin concentration despite increasing use of curative care at the primary 
level. We note that there is considerable disutility associated with being ill and, to 
the best of our knowledge, there is little evidence of ex-ante moral hazard 
empirically (Kenkel, 2000; Miller et al., 2009; Newhouse and and the Insurance 
Experiment Group, 1993).  
 
We test for ex-ante moral hazard by examining the effect of free care on 
prevention and self-reported illness. Table 6 reports the results for the entire 
sample of children and for the two subgroups according to anaemia baseline 
status. The findings in column 1 show that free care had no significant effect 
overall on preventive behaviours or self-reported episodes of illness (measured 
using the pictorial diaries supplied to and collected from households on a monthly 
basis). This remains the case when we stratify the analysis by anaemia status at 
baseline. None of the point estimates in columns 2 and 3 are significant at the 5 
percent level, indicating that free care had no effect on outcomes related to 
prevention or the onset of illness in either of the subgroups of interest (columns 2 
and 3). Taken together, these findings provide evidence that households do not 
exhibit moral hazard behaviour.  
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V.E Effect on Health Care Spending 
One of the primary motivations for removing user fees at the point of service use 
is to provide financial protection to households against the economic 
consequences of ill health. We expect free care to insure consumption against 
health shocks by reducing out-of-pocket health care spending. For risk adverse 
individuals, the welfare gains of consumption smoothing are greatest when faced 
with extreme shocks, which are typically associated with acute or prolonged 
health problems. While we lack data on household consumption and are thus 
unable to measure directly the welfare consequences of free care, we follow 
Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) in showing quantile regression estimates of the 
effect of free care at quantiles of the distribution of out-of-pocket medical care 
spending.  
 
Table 7 presents the overall effect of free care on out-of-pocket medical care 
spending and quantile regression estimates. The removal of user fees reduced out-
of-pocket spending by 2,545 cedis or 20 percent (column 1). The estimate of 
effect from our preferred model is marginally significant at the 10 percent level 
(column 2). The quantile regression results show wide variation in the effect of 
free care that becomes even more obvious when we plot these estimates 
graphically. Figures 3 and 4 confirm that free care has a negative effect on out-of-
pocket medical care spending at all quantiles of the distribution in which spending 
is greater than zero. The pattern of the point estimates from the quantile 
regressions show that the absolute effect tends to be greater at higher levels of 
medical care spending, suggesting that financial protection is particularly effective 
in reigning in outliers at the highest end of the medical care spending distribution.  
 
We have examined health care spending as a proxy indicator of welfare, an 
important endpoint in its own right. A complementary view might consider the 
reduction in the price of health care as an enabling factor to improving access to 
health services, in which case it is instructive to examine the effect of free care on 
out-of-pocket spending across the two subgroups of children. Table 8 reports 
estimates from a subgroup analysis in which total health care spending is the 
dependent variable. Free care reduced total out-of-pocket spending in the group of 
children with anaemia at baseline (column 2). Our preferred point estimate 
indicates a reduction of 5,367 cedis or 37 percent in health care spending. The 
effect of free care in the group of children with no anaemia at baseline is small 
and insignificant (column 3). Although the coefficients in the two subgroups are 
not significantly different from each other, the pattern is consistent with the 
utilisation results.  
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VI. Discussion 
Using a randomised experiment in southern Ghana, we examined the differential 
effects of removing health care user fees for children who were initially ill and 
healthy. We found that free care increased use of primary care, lowered out-of-
pocket spending and reduced anaemia amongst children who were ill at baseline 
but generated no benefits for initially healthy children. There was no evidence that 
free care encouraged frivolous use of services amongst children with no capacity 
to benefit, and there was no effect on the population under study overall. In this 
section we discuss the potential channels for the effect of free care, highlight the 
study limitations and consider the implications of the findings.  
 
VI.A Channels 
In the discussion of potential channels, a useful starting point is the simple causal 
model of health insurance outlined by Card et al (2009). The removal of user fees 
provides insurance with certain characteristics, insurance affects health care 
services and health services affect health. In this simplified model, insurance is 
made up of different elements that each contribute additively to the reduced form 
effects of removing user fees. For example, whether the family has any insurance 
coverage at all and the supply-side incentives faced by providers represent two 
separate channels through which insurance can influence quality-adjusted health 
services. 
 
There are several reasons to believe that it was insurance coverage alone that led 
to the increase in the use of formal health services amongst children who were 
initially ill. First, because the prepayment insurance scheme paid health providers 
on a fee-for-service basis, there was little or no change in the incentives they 
faced. If anything, delays in payment may have dampened incentives to provide 
quality care for insured individuals. Second, the experiment led to a sharp change 
in insurance status from no coverage to full coverage for those assigned to the 
treatment group, which means we do not have to address the issue of some 
families moving from one type of insurance to another. The effect of free care on 
use of primary care at the extensive margin was 9 percentage points (Table 2). 
Given that the maximum contribution of “any insurance coverage” to increased 
use is 39 percentage points, it is perfectly feasible that coverage alone was 
responsible for what we observed.  
 
The next question relates to the channels through which health services improved 
health. The findings show that free care led to a shift in utilisation from informal 
providers to formal providers rather an increase in the total volume of services. 
This pattern suggests that the improvement in health was the result of a shift 
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towards what are probably higher quality providers. However, it remains unclear 
what was the relative contribution of primary health care at the extensive and 
intensive margin. 
    
We can gain further insight by noting that the maximum contribution of use of 
primary health care at the extensive margin cannot exceed the effect of free care 
on use of primary care times the average prevalence of anaemia amongst children 
in the control group since anaemia can at most be reduced to zero. The average 
prevalence of anaemia is 37 percent in the control group (Table 3) and the 
utilisation impact for the group of children who were ill at baseline is 9 percentage 
points (Table 2). The maximum reduction in anaemia attributable to the increase 
in the number of children using primary care at the extensive margin is therefore 
0.032, about 54 percent of our estimate of effect of free care on anaemia. If we 
assume that care was not effective in all cases, a reasonable conclusion is that the 
reduction in anaemia was due in equal measure to increases in the use of primary 
care at the extensive and intensive margin.  
 
Turning to the IV estimate, our reading of the literature suggests that the effect of 
primary care on haemoglobin concentration of 2.7 g/dl is plausible.
14
 As 
previously mentioned, before the trial started the study district instituted a policy 
switch from chloroquine to the more effective amodiaquine plus artesunate as the 
first line treatment drug for malaria and evidence from the trial shows that 
chloroquine was being used very little by the end of study.  
 
VI.B Limitations 
There is a natural tendency to overplay the economic significance of positive 
findings and extrapolate them beyond the study context. We urge caution for a 
number of reasons. First, a cost-benefit analysis was beyond the scope of the 
study, thus we are no position to interpret the findings for the purposes of a 
policymaker who wishes to know whether or not to remove user fees. We could 
have compared the cost of subsidising the health insurance (20,000 cedis per 
family) as well as the additional cost of increased utilisation with the benefits of 
improved health and reduced financial stress. Not only do we lack the data for 
such an analysis, we would have had to make heroic assumptions in the 
monetisation of the benefits.  
 
Although we are unable to reach strong conclusions as to the economic case for 
removing user fees, it is important to point out that implementation of large scale 
                                                 
14
 Anaemia has causes other than malaria. For example, 10 of the 71 children found to be anaemic 
at the final survey and tested for alternative causes had hookworm infection, suggesting that 
malaria treatment may not have been the sole pathway through which primary health care affected 
anaemia in the group of children who were ill at baseline.  
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health financing reforms tends to be messy. Our study shows the theoretical 
potential of removing user fees, but outside the confines of a controlled study, 
impacts might be slower to surface. The estimated effects, while encouraging, are 
reasonably modest in magnitude and are unlikely to imply that removing user fees 
will be the magic bullet to improving population health in low-income countries 
as argued by some commentators. At the same time, we are aware of few 
experimental or quasi-experimental studies that have shown any health benefit of 
removing user fees in a developing country. 
 
A second caveat is that the results from the study do not capture general 
equilibrium effects which may take hold through changes in supply side 
behaviours when user fees are removed at scale. For example, an increase in 
health care use, if poorly anticipated, might put pressure on health providers, 
leading to a reduction in quality of care. A related issue is whether capacity to 
benefit is a generalisable mechanism through which health insurance and similar 
health financing tools work. The development of theory might shed some light on 
this question but empirically it will always be difficult to test because researchers 
are unable (ethically) to manipulate initial health status of a study population. 
Thus results such as those from the fully interacted models in Table 5 should be 
treated with reasonable caution, for heterogeneity may be driven by unobservables 
that are correlated with capacity to benefit. We believe the most promising way 
forward is to examine the role of capacity to benefit in different settings. 
 
A third set of limitations relate to the usual concerns about the peculiarities of the 
study setting. Here we highlight just two factors that limit the generalisability of 
the findings. In settings where drug quality is lower – for example, if ineffective 
antimalarial drugs are in use – an increase in utilisation from the removal of user 
fees may not result in health improvements. Where health worker absenteeism is 
more common, we are likely to see less of an effect on health care utilisation, 
owing to supply side constraints.  
 
VI.C Implications 
The three most important findings of this study are that the introduction of free 
healthcare in this rural developing country context did not increase frivolous use 
of services by those with better health status at baseline, that there was a benefit to 
health in those with greatest capacity to benefit (the least healthy) at baseline, and 
that there was no effect, either positive or negative, on the study population as a 
whole. These data, in this context, are therefore reassuring on some of the greatest 
concerns around introducing free health care, and in particular that those who 
most need care will not benefit, or that there will be a marked increase in frivolous 
use. The lack of a significant impact on the population as a whole however means 
the study cannot lend unqualified support to free health care. The key question of 
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whether free care is cost-effective, as compared to other policies to improve 
health, remains elusive. In Ghana, where the insurance scheme tested in this 
experiment has now been expanded nationwide, these issues may be of particular 
relevance when considering the overall cost of the scheme, and how to secure its 
financial sustainability.  
 
This study demonstrates the clear importance of going beyond utilisation to 
measure health outcomes in the evaluation of health policy. When pathways are 
short and well established, it may be sufficient to measure health care use. 
However, when the causal chain is complex and poorly understood, it is vital to 
measure outcomes that reflect the ultimate objective of the policy. This will 
generally be the case when conducting research on broad health financing 
initiatives.    
 
A key lesson for future research, and one that concurs with the conclusions 
offered by Card et al (2009), is that identifying an effect of health financing 
reforms on health status is challenging. Changes in health outcomes can be 
expected to be too subtle to detect across an entire population, in which case 
research should focus on a subgroup of the population with the greatest capacity 
to benefit. Progress will require ambitious research designs that are powered to 
capture changes in multiples dimension of health. 
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TABLE 1 
VALIDATING RANDOMISATION 
 
Mean in 
treatment group 
Mean in 
control group 
Difference 
Mean p-value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Full Sample of Households 
Mother’s education (years) 5.345 5.183 -0.162 0.390 
Children in household 1.318 1.312 -0.006 0.810 
Male child 0.508 0.499 -0.009 0.680 
Distance from health centre 5-10km 0.210 0.199 -0.010 0.550 
Distance from health centre >10km 0.158 0.158 0.000 1.000 
Age of child (months) 32.867 32.002 -0.865 0.200 
Wealth asset score -0.018 0.022 0.039 0.610 
Christian religion 0.882 0.873 -0.009 0.530 
Dangme ethnicity 0.660 0.624 -0.036* 0.081 
Haemoglobin concentration (g/dl) 10.354 10.324 -0.030 0.660 
Panel B: Sample of Households with Anaemic Child at Baseline 
Mother’s education (years) 4.725 4.868 0.143 0.628 
Children in household 1.352 1.329 -0.024 0.570 
Male child 0.522 0.482 -0.040 0.260 
Distance from health centre 5-10km 0.219 0.213 -0.006 0.843 
Distance from health centre >10km 0.149 0.170 0.021 0.413 
Age of child (months) 29.764 28.369 -1.395 0.185 
Wealth asset score -0.395 -0.254 0.141 0.182 
Christian religion 0.851 0.856 0.005 0.844 
Dangme ethnicity 0.653 0.636 -0.017 0.613 
Haemoglobin concentration (g/dl) 8.778 8.682 -0.096 0.190 
Panel C: Sample of Households without Anaemic Child at Baseline 
Mother’s education (years) 5.708 5.381 -0.327 0.177 
Children in household 1.298 1.302 0.004 0.891 
Male child 0.500 0.510 0.010 0.725 
Distance from health centre 5-10km 0.205 0.191 -0.014 0.529 
Distance from health centre >10km 0.163 0.150 -0.013 0.512 
Age of child (months) 34.685 34.279 -0.407 0.632 
Wealth asset score 0.203 0.194 -0.009 0.933 
Christian religion 0.901 0.884 -0.016 0.340 
Dangme ethnicity 0.664 0.616 -0.048* 0.068 
Haemoglobin concentration (g/dl) 11.277 11.352 0.075 0.133 
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level for the test of equality of means. There are 
2,151 households in the full sample, 812 households in the sample with anaemic child, and 1,339 households in 
the sample without anaemic child.  
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TABLE 2 
EFFECT OF FREE CARE ON USE OF PRIMARY HEALTH SERVICES 
 
Full sample of 
children 
 
By anaemia status at baseline 
Test 
(ill=healthy) 
 Anaemic 
(ill) 
Not anaemic 
(healthy) 
p-value 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Any clinic visit as dependent variable (extensive margin) 
Control mean 0.629  0.614 0.639  
Model:      
Baseline 0.037  0.089 0.004 0.031 
 (0.021)*  (0.030)*** (0.026)  
Baseline + demographics 0.036  0.087 0.002 0.035 
 (0.021)*  (0.031)*** (0.026)  
Number of children 2,319  892 1,427  
Panel B: Clinic visits per year as dependent variable 
Control mean 2.516  2.448 2.560  
Model:      
Baseline 0.298  0.559 0.138 0.089 
 (0.128)**  (0.205)*** (0.155)  
Baseline + demographics 0.286  0.525 0.136 0.113 
 (0.127)**  (0.203)*** (0.153)  
Number of children 2,319  892 1,427  
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at 
the household level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions in Panel A use probit estimation with marginal 
coefficient estimates reported. Regressions in Panel B are estimated by OLS. Demographics include controls for 
mother’s education, number of children in household, age of the child, household wealth and dummies for male 
child, distance from the nearest health centre, Christian religion and Dangme ethnicity. Anaemia is defined as 
having a haemoglobin concentration of less than 10 d/gl.   
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TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF FREE CARE ON ANAEMIA OUTCOMES 
 
Full sample of 
children 
 
By anaemia status at baseline 
Test 
(ill=healthy) 
 Anaemic 
(ill) 
Not anaemic 
(healthy) 
p-value 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Anaemic as dependent variable 
Control mean 0.238  0.373 0.151  
Model:      
Baseline -0.017  -0.052 0.009 0.106 
 (0.018)  (0.032) (0.019)  
Baseline + demographics -0.016  -0.060 0.012 0.077 
 (0.018)  (0.033)* (0.019)  
Baseline + demographics + initial Hb -0.016  -0.059 0.010 0.093 
 (0.017)  (0.033)* (0.019)  
Number of children 2,321  892 1,429  
Panel B: Haemoglobin level as dependent variable 
Control mean 11.015  10.418 11.399  
Model:      
Baseline 0.047  0.202 -0.071 0.039 
 (0.067)  (0.109)* (0.078)  
Baseline + demographics 0.048  0.219 -0.072 0.024 
 (0.066)  (0.106)** (0.077)  
Baseline + demographics + initial Hb 0.047  0.215 -0.062 0.031 
 (0.063)  (0.105)** (0.076)  
Number of children 2,321  892 1,429  
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at 
the household level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions in Panel A use probit estimation with marginal 
coefficient estimates reported. Regressions in Panel B are estimated by OLS. Demographics include controls for 
mother’s education, number of children in household, age of the child, household wealth and dummies for male 
child, distance from the nearest health centre, Christian religion and Dangme ethnicity. Anaemia is defined as 
having a haemoglobin concentration of less than 10 d/gl.   
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FIGURE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF HAEMOGLOBIN CONCENTRATION BY BASELINE ANAEMIA STATUS 
 
 
Notes: Figure 1 plots kernel density estimates using an epanechnikov kernel function and an optimal bandwidth. The vertical red line represents the haemoglobin 
concentration threshold used to define anaemia status – ie. children to the left of the line are anaemic. 
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FIGURE 2 
LOCAL AVERAGE EFFECT WITH POLYNOMIAL FIT 
  
Notes: The fitted values are from regressions in which a third order polynomial is estimated 
separately on each side of the haemoglobin concentration threshold of 10 g/dl, used to define 
anaemia. The points are local averages at each percentile of the initial haemoglobin percentile. 
 
   
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
E
n
d
lin
e
 H
a
e
m
o
g
lo
b
in
 L
e
v
e
l
0 20 40 60 80 100
Initial Haemoglobin Percentile
Free Care (Treatment) Polynomial Fit
User Fees (Control) Polynomial Fit
Effect of Free Care by Initital Haemoglobin Level
32 
 
TABLE 4 
QUANTIFYING THE EFFECT OF HEALTH CARE ON HEALTH OUTCOMES 
 
Effect of any clinic visit 
Any clinic visit 
(1st stage) 
Haemoglobin 
concentration 
(2nd stage) 
Haemoglobin 
concentration 
(2nd stage) 
OLS IV OLS 
(1) (2) (3) 
Free care treatment 0.085   
 (0.032)***   
Any clinic visit  2.654 0.022 
  (1.604)* (0.107) 
Demographics YES YES YES 
F(1, 742) on instrument 7.25 - - 
p value (0.007) - - 
Number of children 892 892 892 
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for 
clustering at the household level, are reported in parentheses. The sample used in this analysis is 
children who were anaemic at baseline. 
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TABLE 5 
FULLY INTERACTED MODELS 
 
Clinic visits per  
year 
Haemoglobin 
concentration 
 (1) (2) 
Free care -0.200 -0.268 
 (0.576) (0.311) 
Anaemia × free care treatment 0.498 0.278 
 (0.249)** (0.133)** 
Mother’s education × free care treatment 0.013 0.005 
 (0.032) (0.016) 
Children in household × free care treatment -0.197 -0.008 
 (0.214) (0.102) 
Boy × free care treatment 0.108 -0.162 
 (0.233) (0.123) 
Distance health centre 5 ≥ 10km × free care treatment 0.597 0.016 
 (0.316)* (0.161) 
Distance health centre >10km × free care treatment 0.171 0.132 
 (0.327) (0.188) 
Age of child × free care treatment 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.004) 
Asset wealth × free care treatment 0.122 -0.036 
 (0.075) (0.037) 
Christian (religion) × free care treatment 0.357 0.097 
 (0.374) (0.206) 
Dangme (ethnicity) × free care treatment -0.209 0.265 
 (0.269) (0.134)** 
Number of children 2,319 2,321 
R squared 0.039 0.114 
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for 
clustering at the household level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions are estimated by OLS. All models 
include a set of demographics that control for mother’s education, number of children in household, age of 
the child, household wealth and dummies for male child, distance from the nearest health centre, Christian 
religion and Dangme ethnicity. The models also include a full set of interactions between free care and the 
demographics. Only the coefficients on the interactions are reported.  
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TABLE 6 
FREE CARE AND EX-ANTE MORAL HAZARD 
 
Full sample of 
children 
 
By anaemia status at baseline 
Test 
(ill=healthy) 
 Anaemic 
(ill) 
Not anaemic 
(healthy) 
p-value 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Preventive behaviours 
Slept under bed net last night 0.004  -0.039 0.032 0.074 
 (0.022)  (0.031) (0.028)  
 [0.316]  [0.362] [0.286]  
Slept under bed net last 7 nights 0.026  -0.009 0.051 0.116 
 (0.021)  (0.030) (0.026)*  
 [0.252]  [0.286] [0.231]  
Any malaria prevention measure 0.007  0.026 -0.007 0.222 
 (0.015)  (0.021) (0.019)  
 [0.862]  [0.848] [0.871]  
Panel B: Onset of illness 
Ill past 6 months 0.014  0.018 0.011 0.726 
 (0.011)  (0.015) (0.014)  
 [0.928]  [0.934] [0.924]  
Episodes of illness past 6 months -0.444  -0.177 -0.602 0.523 
 (0.340)  (0.552) (0.410)  
 [9.774]  [10.222] [9.486]  
Episodes of fever past 6 months -0.223  -0.212 -0.220 0.981 
 (0.164)  (0.263) (0.202)  
 [5.551]  [5.794] [5.395]  
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at 
the household level, are reported in parentheses. The mean of the dependent variable in the control group is 
reported in square brackets. Regressions in Panel A use probit estimation with marginal coefficient estimates 
reported. Regressions in Panel B are estimated by OLS. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, 
number of children in household, age of the child, household wealth and dummies for male child, distance from 
the nearest health centre, Christian religion and Dangme ethnicity. Anaemia is defined as having a haemoglobin 
concentration of less than 10 d/gl.   
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TABLE 7 
QUANTILE REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF EFFECT OF FREE CARE ON OUT-OF-POCKET 
HEALTH CARE SPENDING 
 OLS baseline  
OLS baseline with 
demographics 
Quantile 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Out-of-pocket health spending as dependent variable 
Average treatment effect -2545 -2678  
 (1586) (1560)*  
Q60   0 
   (107) 
Q70   -2119 
   (1248)* 
Q80   -3619 
   (1767)** 
Q90   -6992 
   (2701)*** 
Control mean 12,899 12,899 12,899 
Observations 2,321 2,321 2,321 
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. OLS standard errors, corrected for 
clustering at the household level, are reported in parentheses. Quantile regression standard errors are 
calculated based on 200 bootstraps. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, number of 
children in household, age of the child, household wealth and dummies for male child, distance from the 
nearest health centre, Christian religion and Dangme ethnicity. The exchange rate at the time of the study 
was 16,000 cedis to each £1. 
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FIGURE 3 & FIGURE 4 
EFFECT OF FREE HEALTH CARE ON OUT-OF-POCKET SPENDING 
 
 
Notes: Figure 3 shows quantile regression estimates of the effect of free care on out-of-pocket spending in the four weeks 
prior to interview (solid line), with their 95 percent confidence interval (short dashed lines) and the mean effect (long 
dashed line). Estimates are calculated starting at the smallest percentile with non zero out-of-pocket health spending in 
either the treatment or control group. Standard errors are estimated via bootstrapping with 200 repetitions. Figure 4 
shows the distribution of out-of-pocket spending in the four weeks prior to interview in the control group (solid line) and 
the estimated distribution in the treatment group (short dashed line), calculated as the sum of the control group and the 
quantile regression coefficient estimated at each percentile. The quantile regressions include controls for mother’s 
education, number of children in household, age of the child, household wealth and dummies for male child, distance 
from the nearest health centre, Christian religion, and Dangme ethnicity. 
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TABLE 8 
EFFECT OF FREE CARE ON OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH CARE SPENDING 
 
Full sample of 
children 
 
By anaemia status at baseline 
Test 
(ill=healthy) 
 Anaemic Not anaemic p-value 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Control mean 12,899  14,357 11,959  
Model:      
Baseline -2,543  -5,230 -865 0.188 
 (1,586)  (2,766)* (1,861)  
Baseline + demographics -2,678  -5,367 -1,001 0.188 
 (1,560)*  (2,773)* (1,825)  
Number of children 2,321  892 1,429  
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at 
the household level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Demographics include 
controls for mother’s education, number of children in household, age of the child, household wealth and 
dummies for male child, distance from the nearest health centre, Christian religion and Dangme ethnicity. 
Anaemia is defined as having a haemoglobin concentration of less than 10 d/gl. The exchange rate at the time of 
the study was 16,000 cedis to each £1. 
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TABLE A1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Baseline study 
sample 
Baseline self-
enrolled sample 
Ghana DHS 2008 
(Rural) 
Panel A: Anaemia Outcomes at Baseline (Children Sample) 
Haemoglobin concentration (g/dl) 10.32 10.68 9.28 
 (1.61) (1.50) (1.73) 
Anaemic (Hb<10 g/dl) 0.380 0.273 0.631 
 (0.485) (0.447) (0.483) 
Panel B: Demographics at Baseline (Children Sample) 
Mother has no education 0.313 0.170 0.578 
 (0.463) (0.377) (0.494) 
Christian religion 0.874 0.933 0.690 
 (0.332) (0.250) (0.463) 
Dangme ethnicity 0.642 0.648 0.032 
 (0.479) (0.479) (0.177) 
Radio 0.754 0.818 0.723 
 (0.431) (0.387) (0.659) 
Television 0.319 0.491 0.226 
 (0.466) (0.501) (0.819) 
Refrigerator 0.160 0.364 0.120 
 (0.367) (0.483) (0.586) 
Bicycle 0.268 0.370 0.448 
 (0.443) (0.484) (0.733) 
Children in household 1.44 1.515 1.954 
 (0.64) (0.650) (1.025) 
Male child 0.50 0.53 0.515 
 (0.50) (0.501) (0.500) 
Distance from health centre 5 ≥ 10km 0.20 0.127 n/a 
 (0.40) (0.334)  
Distance from health centre >10km 0.16 0.000 n/a 
 (0.37) (0.000)  
Age of child (months) 32.3 31.7 31.8 
 (15.7) (15.4) (15.7) 
Number of children 2,525 165 1,473 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics from the Ghana DHS 2008 uses the sample of children under five years old in 
rural areas for which there are data on haemoglobin concentration. 
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TABLE A2 
EFFECT ON USE OF OTHER TYPES OF HEALTH PROVIDER 
 
Full sample of 
children 
 
By anaemia status at baseline 
Test 
(ill=healthy) 
 Anaemic Not anaemic p-value 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Use of health care at extensive margin 
Any clinic visit 0.036  0.087 0.002 0.035 
 (0.021)*  (0.031)*** (0.026)  
 [0.629]  [0.614] [0.639]  
Any hospital visit -0.007  0.017 -0.021 0.209 
 (0.015)  (0.025) (0.019)  
 [0.153]  [0.147] [0.157]  
Any pharmacy visit -0.029  -0.055 -0.013 0.326 
 (0.021)  (0.034) (0.027)  
 [0.665]  [0.680] [0.655]  
Any traditional healer visit 0.013  -0.002 0.026 0.087 
 (0.008)  (0.011) (0.012)**  
 [0.035]  [0.045] [0.029]  
Panel B: Number of health care visits 
Clinic visits per year 0.286  0.525 0.136 0.113 
 (0.127)**  (0.203)*** (0.153)  
 [2.516]  [2.448] [2.560]  
Hospital visits per year -0.029  0.070 -0.090 0.145 
 (0.055)  (0.091) (0.066)  
 [0.471]  [0.456] [0.481]  
Pharmacy visits per year -0.302  -0.573 -0.134 0.093 
 (0.134)**  (0.207)*** (0.169)  
 [2.971]  [3.096] [2.890]  
Traditional healer visits per year 0.011  -0.029 0.037 0.199 
 (0.029)  (0.044) (0.034)  
 [0.110]  [0.132] [0.096]  
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at 
the household level, are reported in parentheses. . The mean of the dependent variable in the control group is 
reported in square brackets. Regressions in Panel A use probit estimation with marginal coefficient estimates 
reported. Regressions in Panel B are estimated by OLS. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, 
number of children in household, age of the child, household wealth and dummies for male child, distance from 
the nearest health centre, Christian religion and Dangme ethnicity. Anaemia is defined as having a haemoglobin 
concentration of less than 10 d/gl.   
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TABLE A3 
ROBUSTNESS TO EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN WITH SEVERE ANAEMIA AT BASELINE 
 
Full sample of 
children 
 
By anaemia status at baseline 
Test 
(ill=healthy) 
 Moderately 
anaemic 
Not anaemic p-value 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Use of health care 
Clinic visits per year 0.286  0.568 0.141 0.110 
 (0.127)**  (0.230)** (0.153)  
 [2.516]  [2.492] [2.560]  
Any clinic visit (%) 0.036  0.092 0.002 0.035 
 (0.021)*  (0.034)*** (0.026)  
 [0.629]  [0.619] [0.639]  
Panel B: Anaemia 
Haemoglobin level 0.047  0.169 -0.062 0.075 
 (0.063)  (0.107) (0.076)  
 [11.015]  [10.559] [11.399]  
Anaemia (%) -0.014  -0.032 0.013 0.187 
 (0.018)  (0.025) (0.023)  
 [0.238]  [0.339] [0.151]  
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at 
the household level, are reported in parentheses. . The mean of the dependent variable in the control group is 
reported in square brackets. Regressions in Panel A use probit estimation with marginal coefficient estimates 
reported. Regressions in Panel B are estimated by OLS. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, 
number of children in household, age of the child, household wealth and dummies for male child, distance from 
the nearest health centre, Christian religion and Dangme ethnicity. Moderate anaemia is defined as having a 
haemoglobin concentration of less than 10 d/gl and greater or equal to 8 d/gl.   
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TABLE A4 
USING ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF HEALTH TO DEFINE SUBGROUPS 
 
Full sample of 
children 
 
By health status at baseline 
Test 
(ill=healthy) 
 Ill Healthy p-value 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Health defined according to parasitaemia 
Any clinic visit (%) 0.036  0.039 0.037 0.963 
 (0.021)*  (0.038) (0.026)  
 [0.629]  [0.596] [0.644]  
Clinic visits per year 0.286  0.264 0.287 0.935 
 (0.127)**  (0.237) (0.154)*  
 [2.516]  [2.348] [2.587]  
Parasitaemia (%) 0.029  0.014 0.003 0.769 
 (0.017)*  (0.031) (0.021)  
 [0.159]  [0.241] [0.139]  
Parasitaemia -192.845  -18.216 -314.811 0.700 
 (232.056)  (720.388) (223.704)  
 [700.865]  [1006.414] [654.751]  
Panel B: Health defined according to underweight 
Any clinic visit (%) 0.036  0.032 0.036 0.949 
 (0.021)*  (0.051) (0.022)  
 [0.629]  [0.613] [0.632]  
Clinic visits per year 0.286  0.596 0.229 0.288 
 (0.127)**  (0.328)* (0.133)*  
 [2.516]  [2.387] [2.542]  
Underweight (%) -0.002  -0.015 0.010 0.434 
 (0.016)  (0.026) (0.017)  
 [0.157]  [0.559] [0.082]  
Height for age 0.006  0.078 -0.018 0.355 
 (0.045)  (0.093) (0.045)  
 [-0.975]  [-2.019] [-0.783]  
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at 
the household level, are reported in parentheses. . The mean of the dependent variable in the control group is 
reported in square brackets. Regressions in Panel A use probit estimation with marginal coefficient estimates 
reported. Regressions in Panel B are estimated by OLS. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, 
number of children in household, age of the child, household wealth and dummies for male child, distance from 
the nearest health centre, Christian religion and Dangme ethnicity.   
 
 
 
 
